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Introduction
This policy research brief draws on the findings of a UNDP-supported book, Privatization and
Alternative Public Sector Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa (Bayliss and Fine, forthcoming),
to analyse the effects of privatisation on the delivery of water and electricity. Its chief
conclusion? Privatisation has been a widespread failure. This has hampered progress on
the MDGs for both water and sanitation, and on many other MDGs dependent on energy.
Privatisation has failed on several counts. Contrary to expectations, private investors
have shied away from investing in such utilities in the region. So it has been costly for
governments to motivate them to invest. Moreover, the focus of investors on cost
recovery has not promoted social objectives, such as reducing poverty and
promoting equity.
Thus, current realities dictate refocusing on building up the capacity of the public
sector. It continues to dominate the provision of water and electricity, and will do so
for the foreseeable future. But a dramatic scaling up of both external and domestic
resources will be needed to finance more extensive public investment in these
sectors. This approach is consistent with the current priority of adopting more
ambitious MDG-based development strategies in the region.
The Push for Privatisation
When countries in sub-Saharan Africa became independent, the state dominated
the provision of utilities. However, in the 1980s the debt crisis and the ensuing
contraction of budgets prompted a re-appraisal of public sector provision. Donors
began lobbying for the restructuring of public services; by the 1990s, they were
demanding full-scale privatisation. However, implementation of such reforms has been slow.
One of the chief reasons: lack of interest from private investors. After an initial surge, the pace of privatisation slowed markedly.
Between 1990 and 2003, less than four per cent of global private investment in infrastructure went to sub-Saharan Africa.
Thus, many governments have had to re-align their expectations. They now focus on creating the right conditions for private investors,
having put full-scale privatisation on the back-burner. This approach also involves resorting to short-term management contracts with
private firms as an interim measure.
The initial hopes for privatisation were so high that donor spending on infrastructure fell in the expectation that the private sector
would take up the slack. For example, World Bank lending for infrastructure investment declined by 50 per cent during 1993-2002—
with much of this directed towards preparing firms for privatisation. In 2002, Bank lending for water and sanitation projects, in
particular, was only 25 per cent of its annual average during 1993-97.
At the same time, the World Bank increased its support for private investment in utilities through its International Finance Corporation
and its Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. While Bank lending to public electricity utilities dropped from about US$ 2.9 billion
in 1990 to only US$ 824 million in 2001, its sector lending to private investors rose from US$ 45 million to US$ 687 million.
Hence, African countries have been caught in a terrible bind. Not only has donor financing of public investment declined but also
private investment has followed suit. Moreover, many governments have had to adopt fiscal austerity programmes, which have led
to further declines in domestic public investment in utilities.
Achieving the MDGs
Lack of investment has meant that most countries in sub-Saharan Africa have made little progress towards the MDG target of halving
the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water. They have made even less progress on providing access to
electricity, which is the basis for reaching many MDGs, such as the education and health goals.
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Table 1
Sustainable Access to an Improved Water Source
(% of Population)
Source: Human Development Report (2006), Table 7.
Table 2
Access to Electricity
(% of Population)
Source: World Energy Outlook (2002 and 2004).
Table 1 shows that in 2004 just 56 per cent of the population in
sub-Saharan Africa had access to an improved water source—
23 percentage points lower than the developing-country
average. A bleaker picture emerges in the electricity sector
(Table 2). The proportion of the population in sub-Saharan
Africa with access to electricity rose at a snail’s pace over thirty-
two years—from nine per cent to only 24 per cent. In 2002,
over half a billion people in the region still lacked access to
electricity, about 80 per cent of them in rural areas. As shown in
the table, the other poorest region of the world, South Asia,
made much more progress during this period.
Re-Affirming State Provision
As a result of the failure of privatisation, many donors have had
to rethink their reform models. In 2004, two influential reports
(World Bank 2004; OECD 2004) highlighted the deficiencies of
infrastructure privatisation. The World Bank report described
the privatisation of infrastructure as ‘oversold and
misunderstood’ and highlighted the need for a case-specific
approach. The OECD Report concluded that sub-Saharan Africa
had fared particularly badly from privatisation, failing to
promote social objectives, in particular.
Both reports put greater emphasis on laying the pre-conditions
for successful privatisation. These include the need to ensure
good governance, competition and regulation. However, both
reports fail to consider seriously the option of strengthening
public sector provision of utilities. Where privatisation does not
work, the knee-jerk response is to strive even harder to make it
succeed—even when the prospects for success have already
proved discouraging. A deep-seated ideological aversion to the
public sector is probably a major explanatory factor.
The country case studies in the publication Privatisation and
Alternative Public Sector Reform in sub-Saharan Africa confirm
that despite years of trying to privatise utilities, the state
remains, by far, the dominant provider of water and electricity.
Even in countries where there has been some private sector
participation, a strong state has still been needed to monitor
and regulate private firms.
Contrary to popular perception, private sector participation
does not increase competition. Private investors are interested
in risk-free rather than competitive environments. In practice,
they often do not compete to win contracts so much as
governments compete to attract their investment. When firms
secure government contracts, they are frequently given
exclusive rights for a protracted period. In Cameroon, for
instance, the multinational AES was awarded exclusive
management responsibilities for generation, transmission and
distribution of electricity for 20 years.
This kind of experience, repeated throughout the continent,
suggests that instead of offering lucrative incentives to private
firms, the policy priority should be to refocus on building state
capacity since the public sector will certainly continue to
dominate provision.
The Tanzania experience
The privatisation experience in Tanzania illustrates this point.
Although originally an enthusiastic supporter of neo-liberal
reforms, the government is now taking back control of the
water and electricity sectors. Having put the state electricity
utility on the privatisation list for years, the government has
recently removed it, largely because of lack of investor interest.
When the utility’s short-term management contract with a
private firm expired at the end of 2006, the utility reverted to
public management. Private Sector Participation in this sector
has been expensive and inflexible. For instance, the state
electricity company plans to take over a major privately owned
power plant in order to save money.
Also in Tanzania, the privatisation of Dar es Salaam’s water
supply began in the mid-1990s. This first attempt collapsed in
2000 while a second attempt elicited only one bid, from a
consortium led by the UK firm, Biwater. Although the contract
with this firm was signed in 2003, it was terminated 18 months
later after no improvement in services. Subsequently,
management of the sector was transferred to a specially
created public company, under the leadership of a new and
effective CEO. Major improvements were evident within the
first three months of operation.
The Adverse Social Consequences of Privatisation
The financial difficulties of many state utilities in the 1980s led
to a focus on achieving financial sustainability. Attaining social
objectives was relegated to a later stage. As a result, poor
households have suffered from the reduction in subsidies and
disconnection from services when they are unable to pay.
Moreover, service delivery has become more fragmented,
intensifying inequalities in provision.
Pricing mechanisms
The pricing of utility services poses major challenges in sub-
Saharan Africa. In the past, prices were often set below cost.
Thus, raising prices has been a crucial step in contributing to
financial sustainability. But what costs should utilities try to
recover? Covering a greater share of operating costs might
make sense. But expecting consumers to also pay for new
investment is unrealistic.
Efforts to introduce full cost recovery have floundered because
utilities are squeezed between the high costs of their
operations and the low incomes of many of their consumers.
Costs are often high because many utilities suffer from decrepit
infrastructure, caused by the woeful lack of public investment
over many years. As a result, system losses are high.
Region 1990 2004 
Sub-Saharan Africa 48 56 
All Developing Countries 71 79 
 
Region 1970 1990 2002 
Sub-Saharan Africa 9 16 24 
South Asia 17 32 43 
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Figure 1
Payments to Public Utilities Versus Private Providers
(US$ per cubic metre of water)
Source: Human Development Report 2006, page 83.
This leads inevitably to imposing unaffordable tariffs on many
consumers. A general rule is that water bills should not exceed
5-6 per cent of monthly household income. But statistics for
Zambia in 2002-2003 indicate that, on this basis,  almost one
fourth of households could not afford water tariffs, even those
designed for low-cost housing.
While raising tariffs is intended to improve the financial health
of utilities, it does not always lead to higher revenue.
Consumption can fall if consumers pursue other alternatives.
Often these are unsafe and unhealthy. In Malawi, for instance,
a 25 per cent increase in electricity prices led to a record use
of charcoal even though its production has been illegal since
1997 because of its contribution to deforestation. In South
Africa, price increases have led to intensified use of unsafe
water sources—contributing to a cholera outbreak in 2000.
Instead of resorting so eagerly to raising tariffs, governments
could often reap more gains from reducing system losses. As
prices increase, illegal connections are likely to proliferate. Efforts
should focus on strengthening the capacity of public utilities to
reduce leakages and improve revenue collection. In Ghana, for
example, the regulator of the water and electricity utilities has
recommended an emphasis on reducing system losses while
limiting further tariff increases to those in input costs.
Neglecting the social impact
Typically, the poor pay more for both water and electricity in
sub-Saharan Africa, principally because they have to rely on
more expensive secondary or tertiary suppliers. Figure 1
depicts global comparisons on payments, which apply to Africa
as well. Higher payments by the poor do not imply that they
are indeed willing to pay more. Policymakers and donors often
jump to this conclusion in order to justify higher tariffs.
Poor households have simply had to give up consumption of
other vital items. In other words, they already face the worst
forms of private provision—paying exorbitant tariffs to small
private operators. For example, water vendors operating in
slums, such as in Nairobi, can charge 8-10 times as much as
public utilities that supply piped water. Thus, for the poor,
gaining access to public utilities would be a great improvement.
In addition to worsening poverty, cost recovery can lead to
greater inequality, such as across regions. This has been the
case in Namibia, where price increases have varied
geographically depending on how expensive it is to supply
water. Not surprisingly, price increases have been lower in
wealthier regions and higher in poorer regions, due mainly
to the availability of water in each region.
This impact is worsened by the elimination of cross-subsidies.
In Ghana, for example, rural areas and small towns had
benefited from cross-subsidies on water made possible
by higher tariffs in larger urban areas. But in preparing for
privatisation, the government has eliminated such subsidisation
by separating out the more lucrative urban water services. This
has jeopardised the financial sustainability of rural services.
Subsidies need to be provided in order to promote equitable
access to utility services. Some utilities have introduced ‘lifeline
tariffs’, in which minimal levels of utility services are provided free
or at low cost. However, such subsidies can fail to reach the poor
because they are often not even connected to utilities. Another
alternative is to subsidize connections in poor neighbourhoods.
In some cases, such as for water supplies in rural Namibia and
in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, governments have provided small
subsidies targeted to poor households. This policy can imply,
of course, a labour-intensive process of identifying their needs.
Hence, targeting poor areas is usually more feasible. More
research is needed to identify the impact of various forms of
subsidisation, such as cross, lifeline, connection or targeted
subsidies. Most importantly, such interventions need to be
integrated into a coherent national poverty reduction strategy
in order to be effective.
The Problem of non-payment
A principal challenge for achieving financial sustainability of
water and electricity utilities in sub-Saharan Africa is non-
payment for services. Some consumers fail to pay simply
because they cannot afford to do so. Others do not pay for
reasons unrelated to income. In practice, distinguishing
between these two groups is difficult.
In Senegal the private provider of water was successful in
increasing collection rates by enforcing a strict disconnection
policy. But in this case, about 12 per cent of connections fell
into disuse within Dakar and higher percentages prevailed
outside the city—in some outlying areas spreading to one fifth
of all connections. This undermined the gains achieved in
improving rates of access.
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One proposed solution to this problem is prepayment meters.
Their success depends on the country and the sector. In Namibia,
for instance, such meters have wide coverage for electricity but
have been a failure for water. Poorly functioning meters have
been disastrous for the finances of some municipal authorities.
Often used in informal settlements, many have broken down or
been vandalized. For those households unable to afford the
charges, the use of prepayment meters amounts to an
immediate disconnection policy.
What can be done to enforce payment? Disconnecting services is
often used by private providers. Some public providers also resort
to such harsh methods. Some consumers begin immediately to
pay after being disconnected but many poor households cannot
do so. In some countries, such as Namibia, the debts that such
families owe to local utility providers continue to accumulate
based on accrual of interest, resulting in some cases in eviction
from their homes.
The Need for Scaling up Financing
Most of the public providers of utilities in sub-Saharan Africa
need substantially more financing, especially for investment in
extending service provision. They are trapped in a vicious circle
of deteriorated infrastructure, high system losses, high costs and
low revenue.
Full cost recovery is not an option for most of the region. As a
result of cutbacks in government spending, many water and
electricity utilities are operating with ancient infrastructure.
Lacking the resources to reduce system losses, they are bound to
be inefficient. Their performance improves usually only with an
injection of additional investment finance.
Although one of the poorest countries in sub-Saharan Africa,
Burkina Faso still has a remarkably successful public water utility.
However, this has been due, in part, to large infusions of donor
finance. Among all commercialised state water utilities in
Zambia, the best performer owes its superiority to having
received major external financing for an overhaul of its
infrastructure. Even in Namibia, where the state electricity
provider, NamPower, makes a profit, additional financing is
needed to expand its generation capacity.
In low-income countries, external donors need to play a major role
in financing the public investment needed to expand the supply
of water and electricity, particularly in rural areas. For example,
donors contribute about 90 per cent of the total investment for
water provision in Ghana’s rural areas and small towns.
If the MDG for safe drinking water and many other MDGs are to
be reached in sub-Saharan Africa, external donors will have to
contribute the lion’s share of increased investment. However,
governments will also have to mobilize more domestic revenue for
such purposes. It is certainly feasible to expand the relatively small
revenue base of many countries. In many cases, this is preferable,
on equity grounds, to extracting higher payments directly from
consumers. It is also the only long-term financial solution.
Major Recommendations:
• Invest in Public Utilities: In sub-Saharan Africa, for the
foreseeable future, the state will remain the dominant
provider, by far, of water and electricity. Thus, the financial
and technical resources currently diverted, fruitlessly, to
encouraging private investment should be re-directed
to strengthening public-sector capacities.
• Prioritize Poverty Reduction and the MDGs: Certainly,
improving financial sustainability is necessary for public
utilities but not at the cost of social objectives. Because of
the high costs and low incomes prevalent throughout the
region, heavy reliance on cost recovery is neither viable nor
socially desirable.
• Scale up Financing: Substantially more funds are crucial for
strengthening public-sector delivery of services. ODA needs to
be dramatically boosted in order to finance public investment.
Additionally, governments should focus on mobilizing more
domestic revenue and deploying it to ensure access instead
of resorting to unsustainably high tariffs. 
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